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Abstract 
The question whether algorithms dream of ‘data’ without bodies is asked with the intention 
of highlighting the material conditions created by wearables for fitness and health, reveal 
the underlying assumptions of the platform economy regarding individuals’ autonomy, 
identities and preferences and reflect on the justifications for intervention under the 
General Data Protection Regulation. The article begins by highlighting key features of 
platform infrastructures and wearables in the health and fitness landscape, explains the 
implications of algorithms automating, what can be described as ‘rituals of public and 
private life’ in the health and fitness domain, and proceeds to consider the strains they 
place on data protection law. It will be argued that technological innovation and data 
protection rules played a part in setting the conditions for the mediated construction of 
meaning from bodies of information in the platform economy. 
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I. Introduction. 
The question whether algorithms dream of ‘data’ without bodies is not intended to 
anthropomorphise software. It is asked with the intention of highlighting the material 
conditions created by wearables for fitness and health, so as to reveal the underlying 
assumptions of the platform economy regarding individuals’ autonomy, identities and 
preferences and ensure that the justifications for intervention under the General Data 
Protection Regulation 2016 (‘GDPR’) are carefully scrutinised. The mediatisation of health 
and fitness through affordances such as software applications (‘apps’) and self-tracking 
devices undoubtedly raises important questions about security, design and their 
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 responsiveness to customer sensitivities such as consent, and expectations that processing 
of personal information is fair and legitimate. One important issue that must be considered 
is whether the blurring of boundaries between analogue and algorithmic computation of 
meaning relating to bodies of information in platform infrastructures requires additional 
strands of understanding to ensure that analysis of concepts such as profiling and 
automated decision-making are given greater regulatory emphasis. This immediately raises 
the related question whether the long-established distinction made in data protection law 
between personal data and non-identifiable data, which relied on boundary management 
norms and with an eye towards constraining information processing pathologies in State 
and commercial contexts, can continue to provide a coherent framework for regulating 
algorithmic construction of individual’s digital identities, behaviour and preferences in 
health and fitness domains. The article begins by highlighting key features of platform 
infrastructures and wearables in the health and fitness landscape, explains the implications 
of algorithms automating, what can be described as ‘rituals of public and private life’ in the 
health and fitness domain, and proceeds to consider the strains they place on data 
protection law (Papacharissi 2015, 10). It will be argued that technological innovation and 
data protection rules played a part in setting the conditions for the mediated construction 
of meaning from bodies of information in the platform economy. If data protection rules 
are to provide a democratic and sustainable system not just for corporate elites, there is an 
urgent need to reassess how best a just and democratic society can benefit from the lexicon 
of classification, standardisation and reification of persons by the algorithmic hand driving 
the platform economy - l'esprit algorithmes.  
 
II. Health Platforms and Fitness Wearables Infrastructure. 
 
One way to grapple with the significance of platform infrastructures and wearables in 
structuring individuals’ personal information for our understanding of data protection 
policy-making would be to reflect on its technological, computational and social layers 
which not only provide the ‘building blocks of social action’ but also define the contexts 
within which agency is experienced (Couldry and Hepp 2016, 141). 
A. Nature of Health and Fitness Platforms and Wearables. 
Platforms are the latest iteration of corporate actors, technological innovators and health 
organisations, harnessing the value of infrastructures and data processes to structure 
 economic and social relations. The following description of platforms provides a useful 
commencing point for the analysis to follow: 
 Technologically speaking, platforms are the providers of software, (sometimes)  
 hardware, and services that help code social activities into a computational  
 architecture; they process (meta)-data through algorithms and formatted protocols  
 before presenting their interpreted logic in the form of user-friendly interfaces with  
 default settings that reflect the platform owner’s strategic choices. (Van Dijk 2013, 
 29) 
 
Van Dijk’s account of platforms is illuminating in two ways. First, it draws attention to the 
importance of not restricting our understanding of technological infrastructures to the form 
and content of interactions taking place within these environments for communication. As 
sophisticated software technologies enable platforms to identify, classify and evaluate 
information generated in these spaces, an understanding of how and why technological and 
design infrastructures make remediation possible are equally important to understanding 
the role of the GDPR in grappling with algorithmic decision-making. Second, this framing 
of platforms complements Hildebrandt’s observation that analytically, infrastructures also 
reinforce new forms of technological, cultural and economic logics which go unnoticed 
and the risk this poses for the rule of law (2015, 179–181). Consequently, understanding 
the interplay of automation, networked knowledge and calculated publics becomes 
relevant since control over information flows has consequences for individuals in the way 
autonomy and agency are exercised. Platform infrastructures, to extend van Dijck’s 
insights, may be viewed as spaces of computed sociality where individuals are provided 
with affordances and tools in embodied contexts (Tempini 2015). Platforms are therefore 
not simply friction-free spaces for connectivity bridging online and offline environments, 
but they also construct contexts through which individuals now view their agency, 
experiences and interactions within a social and cultural milieu. Quantified self-
communities, patient advocacy groups like PatientsLikeMe and communities of fitness-
tracking enthusiasts are contemporary examples of networked publics made possible by 
technological infrastructures, enabling individuals and communities to be readily 
connected anytime, anywhere and from any device (Gilmore 2015).  Health service 
providers make available to users a centralised portal of resources, which can be accessed 
 easily through convenient web interfaces and mobile interfaces.1 Platforms also provide 
new participatory and collaborative opportunities, as costs for collection, storage and use 
of data are reduced. Archives and data sets provide repositories for reducing storage, 
search and information costs and the efficiencies generated help create and sustain 
collaborative partnerships for research, investment and innovation. Platforms such as the 
HealthSuite owned by Philips Healthcare’s illustrate how platform ideas and logic 
contribute to the automation of information flows, development of networks of 
collaboration between manufacturers, suppliers, health professionals and patients and use 
of personal data. 
 
Wearable technologies merit consideration in the discourse on platform economy and 
agency, as sensor technologies, smartphones and mobile broadband speeds provide 
continuous interconnectivity, bringing together the digital economy, health and fitness 
eco- system and the practice of everyday life. Wearable technology can be defined as 
devices which incorporate sensors and smart technologies and can be worn on the body 
or integrated into clothing (EDPS Opinion 4/2015, 7). Wearables are sociotechnical 
affordances, which enable individuals as well as patients with opportunities to gain insights 
and understanding of their bodies and social and environmental conditions. User interfaces 
are designed to mobilise individuals and create another stream of information flowing 
through the technological infrastructure. With the domestication of wearable technologies, 
health organisations such as the NHS and corporate actors such as Apple, Google, 
Samsung, Fitbit and Garmin have seized societal desire for self-knowledge, measurement 
and personalisation to promote a culture of well-being and commercial goals, respectively. 
Technologies for tracking and measuring emotional, biological and physical conditions 
also make possible large amounts of data as a resource for innovation, research and the 
delivery of personalised healthcare (NDG 2016). Corporate actors, on the other hand, have 
aggressively promoted health platforms and wearable technologies as lifestyle-enhancing 
opportunities. Agency, access to networked publics and benefits of crowdsourced 
knowledge form the spine of marketing and advertising campaigns in shaping societal and 
consumer expectations. These opportunities are realised in many of ways. Context-aware 
mobile technologies used in monitoring patients or for recreational and fitness purposes 
illustrate how miniaturised electronics and sensors enable information about the user’s 
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 state of mind, activity and context to be easily collected and used to generate valuable 
insights (FTC 2015). Smart devices such as Jawbone Up 2, Fitbit Charge HR, Garmin 
Vivosmart are now equipped with processing functionalities that provide individuals with 
control over their personal information and extend opportunities for managing personal 
goals and lifestyles (Hilts, Parsons, and Knockel 2016, 19–20). Katz’s description of 
wearables as evolving into cultural ‘accoutrements to our self-creation and symbolic 
interpersonal communication’ is a commonly held view of modulated spaces of 
information flows which are transforming the health and fitness landscape (2003, 315–
318). To better articulate why platforms raise data protection challenges, an account is 
needed of how individual’s understandings and expectations of agency become 
institutionalised as a condition for participation in these communication spaces. 
 
B. The Platform Economy for Health and Fitness. 
The platform economy for health and fitness cannot be meaningfully segregated from the 
data economy or offline platforms, which is estimated to have contributed €430bn to the 
EU economy in 2012 (Copenhagen Economics 2013). The European Commission 
announced that the platform economy, which includes services mediated by apps, would 
generate more than €63bn and very likely provide a boost to the European economy.2 This 
is a conservative estimate of the value of markets for personal data for two reasons. First, 
the value of the EU data economy was estimated at 1.85% of EU GDP in 2014 and growth 
forecasts of 5.6% per annum are anticipated for subsequent periods. Second, one objective 
of the GDPR is to facilitate free flows of information and mobilise data subjects as 
economic actors in the digital economy. These developments will not only generate 
multiple streams of information flows for personal data markets, but also provide an 
important resource for innovation and development (COM (2017), 9 final 3–4). The next 
generation of health and fitness platforms and devices, with over 30 billion sensors 
becoming integrated into the Internet of Things, will have tangible societal and economic 
ramifications (COM (2016), 180). The National Data Guardian has identified sharing of 
data and communication platforms as being central to the delivery of an efficient and high-
quality connected health care in the public health sector (NDG 2016). Three trends in the 
health and fitness domain should be noted. The work undertaken by MindTech Healthcare 
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 Technology Co-operative serves as a useful barometer of the future of data-driven 
operations in the connected health terrain. A feature of data-driven operations is the 
integration of multiple stakeholders into the spaces of information flows so that each is 
able to access and extract value from personal data. The Co-operative, for example, 
comprises an assemblage of manufacturers, patients, clinicians, retailers and suppliers who 
are part of the mental healthcare and dementia infrastructure providing timely therapeutic 
interventions as well as providing networked services and support across the data value 
creation chain. Google DeepMind and Moorfield’s Eye Hospital’s well-publicised 
collaboration in analysing digital eye scans illustrates another important trend of the logic 
driving information flows – before value can be extracted, data have to be collected and 
subsequently transformed by algorithms into information and knowledge to further the 
objectives of infrastructure providers.3 Finally, the growing influence of corporate power 
in these domains in harnessing value from personal data should not be overlooked. Start-
up investments from Silicon Valley are now being channelled through investment and 
funding activities, acquisitions of content and communication service providers and 
emergence of collaborative partnerships (Casper 2013). 
 
Since data protection laws have long elevated individual’s autonomy, agency and choice, 
two vignettes will be used to illustrate how data-driven operations redefine individuals’ 
agency (Cohen 2016, 62–63). First, John uses Strava, the popular cycling and running 
fitness app and wearables. He purchased the wearable after reading reviews about Strava 
on blogs, was impressed by marketing advertisements extolling the benefits of improved 
personal fitness and was keen to interact with other users on social media. John regularly 
tracks his bike rides and runs via his iPhone or GPS device. He also posts information 
regarding the distances covered and activities completed on the website and regularly 
compares these with performances of other users. John receives push notifications on his 
laptop and smartphone. Second, Colin suffers from serious bouts of forgetfulness and is 
recovering from a triple heart bypass surgery. He uses an activity-monitoring device, which 
alerts him to any prolonged period of inactivity or failure to take his medications. Colin is 
an enthusiastic user of social media and frequently tweets information relating to his health 
condition. He regularly updates his profile on the national patient portal and participates 
in discussions on the secure site made available for users of the activity-monitoring device. 
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 Three observations can be made regarding the mediated construction of participation and 
communication. First, interactions between platforms and individuals are determined by 
information collected in these constructed spaces. Tools and affordances are made 
available to individuals so that control can be exercised over which information becomes 
visible and shared within the networked environment via social media. Privacy settings and 
customisation tools and affordances provide individuals with control to allay concerns 
about privacy. There is another perspective. From a commercial or goal-oriented strategy, 
participation in this environment is conditional on cultural acceptance of rules relating to 
the collection of personal information. This ordering of relations has significant 
consequences for individuals’ expectations of how they exercise and experience their 
autonomy and agency (Langlois and Elmer 2013, 14). Acceptance of the rules triggers a 
chain of data processing operations. Monitoring of individuals’ activities is maintained 
through emails, web surveys, promotional communications and feedback portals. 
Platforms and wearables also enable information to be collected automatically. The reasons 
how and why this is important will be developed later but it can be observed that the 
automatic collection of information during registration and visits to the website and 
resources accessed are presented as measures to enhance customer experience and provide 
high-quality services. Second, platforms subject volunteered and automatically collected 
data to processes that continuously extend the life cycle of personal information through 
automated decision-making and creation of user profiles (LIBE 2015, 19). Apart from the 
use of accessible interfaces and other functional affordances as conduits for collecting 
personal information, push notifications ensure that individuals’ daily activities are 
synchronised with the goal of the platform, which is to sustain information flows. Push 
notifications, such as alerts, emails and real-time updates on the actions of others are haptic 
instants intended to orient or nudge the user towards embracing norms of visibility, sharing 
and participation (Gilmore 2015). Patients such as Colin experience haptic instants 
differently. Real-time monitoring and alerts enable technologies to bridge time and space 
and erode boundaries between ‘human’ and ‘algorithmic’ agency in decision-making. Both 
accounts of haptic instants highlight what Langlois and Elmer describe as the act of 
redefining communication, through data mining processes which ‘seek to enhance, format, 
encode and diagnose communication’ (2013, 14). The flows of bodies of information from 
users to companies or organisations providing infrastructure services are vividly reflected 
by Helmond’s metaphor of platforms as ‘pouring data systems that set up data channels 
to enable data flows with third parties’ (Helmond 2015). Crucially, users remain oblivious 
 to these back-end operations. Business models of leading global companies such as Apple, 
Microsoft, Fitbit, Atheer Labs and Nymi use back-end systems to process digital footprints 
and link these with data purchased from information brokers, and information stored in 
data sets to optimise data (Hilts, Parsons, and Knockel 2016). To be able to monetise data, 
platform providers enframe communication which is akin to the creation of sui generis 
proprietorial-type rights over personal information. It is the next insight which is 
particularly helpful to understanding the significance of the relationship between 
algorithmic processes of decision-making and platforms. 
 
Much of the recent focus on the platform economy resembles familiar debates which 
revolve around the economic logic of rationality, efficiency and innovation (Evans and 
Gawer 2016). There is a deeper issue other than the fact that platforms are now regarded 
as knowledge-generating structures that transcend the biopolitical (Boyd and Crawford 
2012, 663). Health and fitness platforms are not simply infrastructures of economic logic 
and social utility but in the context of the platform economy, also one of computational 
grammar. Algorithms analyse input data as ‘digital objects’ at three intersecting levels: the 
textual or semantic elements, affordances used and an algorithmic lexicon that generates 
insights, information and knowledge from bodies of information so that value can be 
extracted (Langlois and Elmer 2013, 11–13). What we are concerned with here is not just 
the construction of meaning from textual or semantic information but the ‘nontrivial 
extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful information from data’ 
to generate new knowledge, hypothesis and patterns based on design choices that convert 
behaviour, identity and preferences of individuals into digital code (Frawley, Piatetsky-
Shapiro, and Matheus 1992, 58). Agre’s account of algorithmic logic is particularly helpful 
in drawing attention to how and why algorithmic conversion of bodies of information into 
computer code needs to be taken seriously by policy-makers notwithstanding the benefits 
for enhancing public health and innovation (1994, 105–112). The process of data capture, 
aggregation and value extraction, he observes, is structured by a ‘grammar of action’ which 
is contingent on questions identified by the processor and goals to be attained (Agre 1994, 
116). The transformation of information into software code leads to the construction of 
what Esposti describes as the digital self, whereby the life cycle of personal data is gradually 
layered by feedback loops and continuously aggregated with data from multiple sources in 
the value chain (2014, 212–213). The important consequences for human agency will be 
elaborated in the next section. 
  
C. Conclusion. 
Imperceptibly, the everyday practice of life, whether by visits to the hospital, recording of 
blood and glucose results, interactions on social media or achieving personal targets in 
sporting activity end up with reality being constructed autonomously, with little or no 
effective regulatory or individual oversight (Turow, McGuigan, and Maris 2015, 475– 476). 
Data protection rules could arguably be seen as a framework that anticipates such 
problems by appealing to data controllers to exercise restraint, on the one hand, and data 
subjects urged to exercise their agency and information rights, on the other. Its genealogy 
may shed some light on why corporate actors tend to view the law’s ordering of 
information relations and broad information processing principles as business as usual. 
III. The General Data Protection Regulation and Mediated Construction of Bodies 
of Information: Framing the Data Protection Challenge. 
 
‘In the face of  this dramatic revolution taking place in our societies, Silicon Valley tells us 
that everything will be fine…They dictate their rules to us…The hard currency of  the 
digital age is, as it were, being filched from our pockets without our even noticing. This 
process has been going on so surreptitiously and for all practical purposes without 
regulation that these businesses are now the biggest undertakings in the world.’ (Albrecht 
2016, 473-474) 
 
Albrecht’s concerns could be dismissed as mere rhetoric, but it does not detract, however, 
from the unease felt by many that data protection rules are being increasingly used by data 
controllers towards realising economic and commercial goals and leave individuals exposed 
to the erosion of  their privacy and information rights (Acquisti 2009, Solove 2013). An 
examination of  the paradigmatic series of  questions – what type of  data, by whom, for what 
purposes and for how long – that informs the balancing of  interests between individuals 
and organisations may provide us with the beginnings of  an under- standing of  the 
challenges posed by data mining practices and platforms (Fuster 2014; Lynskey 2016). 
However, to fully understand Albrecht’s concerns and the issues raised by the metaphor 
used at the outset in the article, a shift in perspective may help broaden the narrative 
frequently encountered in data protection discourse. We can rephrase the inquiry which 
frames the article simply: what obligations do data protection law impose on data 
 controllers in their use of  algorithms for analytical and predictive purposes in the platform 
economy? This question now takes on particular significance under current GDPR rules 
should data controllers assert: (i) no personal data is being processed; (ii) personal data has 
been manifestly made public by the data subject; (iii) explicit consent by the data subject 
has been obtained or that (iv) measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and legitimate 
interests such as privacy by design, de-identification and anonymisation are in place, 
particularly where automated decisions including profiling have taken place. The following 
discussion will not rehearse long-standing debates in data protection law of  its normative 
foundations or the predatory data mining practices of  corporate actors but will proceed 
instead to indicate those aspects of  data governance easily overlooked and which now 
needs to be re-assessed in the context of  the platform economy. Owing to limitations of  
space, the impact of  the GDPR on public health and biomedical research will not be 
examined, but this will not detract from the line of  reasoning advocated, which is to assess 
the significance of  platform logic for three areas: personal data, rules defining data 
controllers’ obligations and profiling. 
 
A. The Rationale of Dual Objectives. 
Article 1 sets out two objectives of  data protection law, which is to provide rules for the 
free movement of  personal data and the protection of  individuals’ fundamental rights 
including the right to the protection of  their personal data. Since data protection rules 
define how personal information is accessed and used, the balance to be maintained 
between the dual objectives in the communication spaces mediated by technologies has 
become an important policy consideration when accommodating the interests of  data 
controllers and data subjects (EDPS Opinion 4/2015, 9). The Article 29 Working Party 
(‘Article 29 WP’) in its joint statement has no doubt as to the scale of  the challenges 
technological infrastructures pose for the operation of  information rights and obligations 
in the networked environment (WP227 2014, 2–4). Data protection rules operate in an 
environment ultimately constructed by private actors with clearly defined expectations 
about the role and value of  personal data. Data protection rules not only enable personal 
information to be commodified, but also more significantly, structure expectations 
regarding parties understanding of  their information rights, responsibilities and duties. 
Processing of  personal information, for example, is permitted if  an activity meets one of  
six grounds set out in Article 6. The rules also formulate a set of  fair information collection 
and processing principles which urge restraint by data controllers, requiring them, for 
 example, to access and use only minimal information necessary for the purposes for which 
they were collected and retained for a period no longer than required (Article 5). Explicit 
consent is needed when sensitive and health data are processed together with some 
procedural and technical requirements that must be met as a precaution to minimise risks 
to data sub- jects (Article 9, Bodil Lindqvist). To minimise risks to data subjects, data 
controllers are encouraged to adopt technical solutions such as encryption, anonymisation 
and pseudonyms. Within this framework, individuals are provided with a set of  
information rights which enable them to exercise some control over how their personal 
information is used, such as mechanisms for access, disclosure, objection and rectification 
(Articles 12– 19). The GDPR also provides data subjects with exit rights in the form of  a 
right to portability (Article 20). Processing activity which involves anonymised data or data 
that is not personal is not covered by the GDPR. Data protection law also provides 
mechanisms for redress in respect of  the collection, processing or use of  personal data 
(Google Spain, Digital Rights Ireland, and Schrems). 
 
The brief  account serves to illustrate how data protection rules map onto the dual 
objectives and should bring to the surface the complex policy challenges and tensions that 
underpin Albrecht’s concerns. It also makes clear the policy presumption of  reducing 
barriers to the free flow of  information and exceptionally, economic interests will be 
displaced if  erosion of  a user’s personal information is seen to be of  a nature warranting 
intervention, as the Court’s observation in Google Spain makes plain: 
in light of  the potential seriousness of  that interference, it is clear that it cannot be  
justified by merely the economic interest which the operator of  such an engine has 
in that processing. (para. 81) 
 
Finally, it may be useful to recall that historically, the importance attached to the 
complementary role of  dual objectives in data protection law represented a policy 
innovation designed to reflect the emergence of  an information society. The public and 
private sector assumed important roles as repositories for collecting, aggregating and 
processing large amounts of  information (Hustinx 2014). Directive 95/46/EC, the 
predecessor to the GDPR, mirrored a regulatory culture focused not only on minimising 
constitutional threats to citizens but also on the need to create a flexible regulatory 
framework that would enable Internet intermediaries and businesses to help realise 
economic and social objectives (OECD 1980, Commission 2003). However, the platform 
 economy we are concerned with poses some unique challenges not previously 
encountered. The networked society today by all account bears very little semblance to the 
way economic and social activities were conducted during the early period of  the ‘read-
write’ web (Hustinx 2014). Every sphere of  economic, political and cultural activity now 
revolves around the collection, linking, sharing and use of  personal data within a value 
creation chain (COM (2015), 192 final para. 5). Increasingly, individuals are having to 
accept stringent terms regarding the processing of  their personal data (EDPS, Opinion 
8/2016, 11– 13). Data-driven systems are enabled by infrastructure architectures which are 
interoperable and enable personal data to be accessed and used by different actors for a 
wide range of  purposes. Advances in technologies for collecting and repurposing of  
personal information have now accelerated efforts to develop regulatory solutions in 
response to the impact of  data collection practices on individual’s fundamental rights 
(Article 29 WP, Opinion 6/2014, 17, Opinion 8/2014, 6–8, Opinion 3/2016, 5–6). Public 
perception seems to be that the scale of  collection and reuse of  personal information is 
driven very much by economic and commercial imperatives (LIBE 2015, 14–16). 
Notwithstanding these developments, the ruling in Google Spain probably serves as a 
reminder that even though there is consensus on the value of  pursuing the dual objectives, 
there is, however, less agreement on the measures and mechanisms for bridging data 
protection theory and practice, on the one hand, and articulating a vision of  a digital 
economy that does not marginalise the fundamental rights of  individuals, on the other 
(EDPS Opinion 4/ 2015, 14).  
 
B. Personal Data, (Meta) Data and the Digital Self. 
The GDPR rules apply to designated activities which involve the processing of personal 
data of natural persons unless one of the stated derogations apply (Recitals 18–20 and 
Article 2). The protection of personal data is regarded as a fundamental right (Recital 1, 
Promusicae). However, it is not an absolute right and ‘must be considered in relation to its 
function in society and be balanced against other fundamental rights, in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality’ (Recital 4, Schecke para. 86–88). The question whether 
personal data is processed is crucial to triggering the rules under the GDPR. Personal data 
is described as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’ 
(Article 4(1)). Personal information that has been anonymised, in the sense that the data 
subject is no longer identifiable, will not be covered by data protection rules. Furthermore, 
data protection rules do not apply to the processing of anonymised information 
 undertaken for statistical or research purposes. The GDPR now clarifies the scope of 
‘personal data’, which extend beyond physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identifiers and imposes obligations on data controllers to ensure that they introduce 
design solutions safeguarding individuals’ personal information (Article 38, Article 29 WP 
Opinion 3/2016). This is particularly relevant to the context of growing dominance of 
corporate actors in the health and fitness domain, as a wide array of personal information 
can now be accessed and distributed by actors in the platform’s value chain (e.g. location 
data, online identifiers and mobile device identifiers) (Article 4(1)).4 Information collected 
from Jack via an app, the wearable device or uploaded onto the platform would be regarded 
as personal data. Raw sensor data which enable conclusions to be drawn about Colin’s 
health status or health risks would similarly be regarded as coming within the scope of 
sensitive health data. It is arguable that lifestyle apps that enhance an individual’s fitness 
could be regarded as health enhancing and data collected from users’ devices would be 
covered by data protection rules (Article 29 WP, Opinion 2/2013).  
 
One type of data that merits closer scrutiny is the status of unstructured bits of data 
collated from upstream and downstream data operations, which may or may not be 
combined with ‘personal data which are manifestly made public by the data subject’ to 
generate new insights on aspects of an individual’s behavioural, health or cognitive 
conditions (Article 9(2)(e)). Much of the contemporary discussions, inspired in part by 
Westin’s argument that individuals have a right to self-determination regarding their 
accessibility to the public, have been aligned with understandings of theorising the 
relationship between technologies and information in terms of ownership, confidentiality, 
informational privacy or the ‘right to be left alone’. Additionally, the nature of personal 
data has become an area for claims and counterclaims about the effectiveness of privacy 
by design, de-identification, encryption, pseudonyms and anonymity measures (Article 29 
WP, Opinion 2/2013, 5–6, Article 29 WP, Opinion 4/2007). At the root of these debates 
is an etymological one – is data the same as information? Bygrave, for example, regards 
this as a relevant question, since many of the protections available to data subjects and 
obligations imposed on data controllers are unlikely to be available when information 
processed is not regarded as personal data (2010). The etymological conundrum also raises 
a technical issue, namely whether personal information which renders an individual directly 
                                                
4 See Guidance issued by Article 29 Working Party for DPO’s 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-51/wp243_en_40855.pdf 
 or indirectly identifiable can be de-linked to enable data to be processed. The implication 
here is that data, information and knowledge can be viewed sequentially as beginning from 
a state of namelessness to one where identification or identifiability becomes possible (Zins 
2007, 486–489). The state of namelessness is an attractive idea if we recall Nissenbaum’s 
suggestion that this sets limits to the reachability of individuals (1999, 142– 143). To take 
a simple example, 1325001 would seem to achieve the status of namelessness and data 
coupled with the identifier would be regarded simply as data rather than information that 
identifies an individual. What if extraneous anonymised and unrelated data is introduced 
which links 1325001 to Jack, the fitness enthusiast? The Strasbourg Court’s ruling in S and 
Marper v UK (2009), may provide some clues on how the question could be answered. The 
question before the Court was whether DNA samples of persons suspected of breaching 
the criminal law, collected and retained by police in a database was ‘personal data’ rather 
than data that identified an individual. The case was decided in favour of the complainants 
under Article 8 of the ECHR. One argument made before the Court was that unstructured 
bits of code such as DNA samples were themselves not personal data, since individuals 
only became identifiable if material collected from a crime scene was introduced and a 
match produced. This argument was rejected. Bygrave is perhaps right to question the line 
of reasoning that regards data and information as synonymous, even though the travaux 
préparatoires does not provide any clear guidance in this regard (para. 68 and 76). That said, 
when the case was previously heard in the House of Lords, Baroness Hale’s observation 
may give us a sense of the reason why data protection law discourse appears to treat data 
and information as interchangeable. It was observed that an argument that relied on 
distinguishing ‘raw’ data from information derived from data was questionable, as the 
primary consideration for collecting the sample data in the first instance was ‘for the 
information which they contain’ ((2004) UKHL 39 para. 70). Though scholars in 
informatics may question this view, if this observation is correct, the idea of reachability 
may be relied upon to extend the obligations of data controllers to data subjects in the age 
of Big Data (Mittelstadt 2016). The reachability argument could also be used to support 
Borgesius’s analysis of the rationale of the GDPR’s innovative intervention, which ensures 
that individuals singled out by information systems will now continue to be protected 
(2016). The idea of reachability may be particularly relevant when we turn to the role of 
algorithms in creating profiles based on structured and unstructured data even though the 
real-world identity of individuals remains hidden or unknown (Recital 26). More 
significantly, the ruling in Marper reminds us of how knowledge structures that have 
 underpinned our approach to issues of identification and identifiably may now need to 
accommodate the fact that digital technologies are now transforming the way machines 
enable individuals to be easily reached and digital selves created by algorithmic knowledge-
generating structures (Berry 2011, 5). 
 
C. Interaction between Fair, Lawful and Consent Principles. 
Bygraves describes data protection law as being founded on core principles that are 
coherent and whose instrumental value lies in the provision of  ‘guiding standards during 
interest-balancing processes’ (Bygrave, 2002, 57). Data protection rules derive their 
legitimacy from the social contract tradition and its internal coherence and rationality 
creates a principled basis for binding data subjects and data controllers to the authority of  
law. At first glance, the fair information collection and use principles can be said to 
entrench default positions that enable personal information to be processed without 
compromising the information rights and expectations of  individuals (Article 29 WP 
Opinion 03/2013). Article 5, for example, provides a cluster of  values intended to serve 
as a guide to the standard setting role for information processing activities by defining in 
advance the discretion available to data controllers. The GDPR also provides data subjects 
with the right to withdraw their consent, access personal information held by data 
controllers and even object to retention, distribution and subsequent use (Google Spain and 
Schrems). Proportionality, purpose limitation and transparency continue to be regarded as 
an important part of  the regulatory toolkit for restraining predatory data mining practices 
(Article 29 WP Opinion 03/2013, 11–14). Any expectation that fair information collecting 
principles would promote consumer trust or that a market for privacy would emerge in 
tandem with the personal data economy may have been dampened by a grim reality (Article 
29 WP Opinion 8/2014, 4).5 The default positions which safeguard data subjects’ interests 
have been shifted by data controllers to reduce barriers to extracting value from personal 
data (Article 29 WP Opinion 03/2013, 35). Pattern recognition algorithms which subject 
vast amounts of  personal data to analysis also highlight the growing lack of  transparency 
in data-driven operations. These practices also raise questions about the legitimacy of  the 
type of  algorithms being deployed, the predictions being made and the impact of  bias, 
inaccuracies and errors on individuals (Kotthoff  2014, 57). Given that consumers of  
                                                
5 See for example privacy concerns with NHS Health’s free apps library 
http://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12916-015-0444-y and data sharing concerns 
raised by mobile apps http://techscience.org/a/2015103001/. Accessed 3rd December 2016. 
 platform services and wearable devices have considerable knowledge and resource 
constraints, data protection rules are particularly wanting in curbing information 
pathologies ex ante. This shortcoming furthermore obscures a more significant 
consequence for individual’s expectations of  how their personal information is processed 
and used. Article 6(f) together with contractual arrangements between data controllers and 
data subjects, grounds fundamental rights claims within market-oriented mechanisms 
(Raab 1999, 75–76; Article 29 WP, Opinion 6/2014, 23–43). 
 
Finally, the continued role and value of  consent in technologically mediated environments 
have been placed under immense strain in the networked environment (Hildebrandt 2008). 
A combination of  apathy, difficulty in grasping information practices in privacy policies, 
assumptions regarding data controllers’ compliance and lack of  enforcement have 
contributed to considerable consumer anxiety and mistrust (Sweeney 2013). There is 
another issue. Treating explicit consent as separate from obligations of  fair and legitimate 
processing places the onus on data controllers to supervise their behaviour and avoid 
‘gaming’ data protection law. The accountability gap is also exacerbated by the fact that it 
is burdensome, if  not impossible, for individuals to continually manage and monitor their 
interactions and digital footprints. It is true that while consent from individuals can be 
obtained either expressed or implied, Article 9 implements additional prescriptive 
requirements where personal sensitive data is processed. However, not dissimilar problems 
of  choice, lack of  understanding and imbalance in bargaining power continue to be 
encountered. Consent, for the purposes of  the health and fitness domain, is one of  the 
grounds for legitimate processing under Article 6(f) and Article 9. Data protection rules, 
well intentioned though they may be, too readily assume that data controllers are 
incentivised to act in a manner that aligns their expectations with the interests of  data 
subjects. Manufacturers of  wearable devices such as Fitbit now join the list of  platform 
and service providers that:  
 alter practice and sometimes pull norms and standards along with them ... and  
 reconfigure ontologies ... [and] define ethical and political precepts. (Nissenbaum  
 2015, 160) 
 
The emerging conception of agency in technology-mediated environments suggests that 
the right to self-determination is far from being an effective mechanism for curbing 
corporate actors overreaching their processing activities (EDPS Opinion 4/2015, 11–13). 
 If any headway is to be made in this area of policy-making, three assumptions that underpin 
the liberal view of consent as a benchmark of agency and autonomy must be confronted. 
First, that users of wearables and health platforms can define a priori what type of 
information can be accessed and by whom. Second, related to the first is the logistical and 
technical challenge for users to discover if fair processing principles have been breached. 
Third, the right to self-determination assumes that individuals can make assessments about 
inferences that can be drawn either from individual tweets, posts or when these are linked 
with information to their data trails. Taken together, any sense that information is relational 
and expectations are justiciable are winnowed by ex post remedial sanctions and 
unmonitored back-end data-driven operations. As Cohen observes, the governance 
dilemma encountered in the platform economy is not Orwellian but that of overcoming 
an entrenched vision of an information society being sustained by ‘an atmosphere of 
regulatory lenity’ (2016, 62). 
 
D. Data without Bodies, Automated Decision Making and Profiling. 
“Chat Bot Message: Hi Aisha. If your thoughts turn to a Romantic Weekend, don’t 
forget we can provide you with some really nice champagne. We also have some decadent 
chocolates and cakes. Before I forget – congratulations on your engagement!” 
 
The vignette provides a relatively simple view of interactions in spaces constructed by 
communication infrastructures (Bowers and Rodden 1993). Algorithms, platforms and 
communication spaces have become so much a natural part of our daily lives that we cease 
to notice them and underestimate their far-reaching influences on our expectations and 
choices (cf. Weiser 1991). A recurring sub-theme of this article is that the materiality of 
conditions now makes it difficult to ascertain the boundaries between machine and human 
agency. Albrecht’s desire to reshape the normative contours of corporate dominance 
within a constitutional domain should also be understood in terms of how data protection 
rules sustain and internalise ‘algorithmically rendered materiality’ (Papacharissi 2015, 119). 
Boundary management is important, as it enables individuals to define and control access 
to the self. To contextualise key provisions in the GDPR that address automated decision-
making and profiling, we need, however, to look beyond the interactions between human 
and computing technologies. Focus should instead be directed towards the role of 
algorithms in structuring and defining how individuals now interact with information and 
experience their environment. Significantly, it is through interactions with information that 
 experiences are framed and amplified. These thoughts will inform the subsequent analysis 
of Articles 21 and 22 of the GDPR. 
 
Profiling, which comprises the output of the automated algorithmic process, involves 
pattern recognition and n-gram modelling for predictive or assessment purposes based on 
volunteered, observed and cloud sourced data. Individuals such as Jack, Colin and Aisha, 
as subjects of information rights are, for example, provided with mechanisms under the 
GDPR to object to processing of personal information should profiles of their behaviour 
and preferences be created (Article 21) but only when data controllers’ lawful authority is 
dependent on the argument that such form of processing is necessary in attaining the 
legitimate commercial interests of the controller or third party (Article 7 (f)). To be entitled 
to a successful claim under this provision, when data subjects are made aware of this 
practice taking place, they must show, however, that the profiling has seriously undermined 
their fundamental rights (Digital Rights Ireland). Data controllers can, of course, provide 
evidence of an audit of the algorithm to show why the legitimate interests or the 
fundamental rights of the data subject have not been overridden. Data subjects, it should 
be said, still retain the right to object to any direct marketing which may be based on their 
purchasing activities, behaviour and interests (Article 21(2)). Unlike Article 21, Article 
22(1) prohibits automated processing, including profiling which produce legal effects or is 
likely to produce a significant outcome for data subjects. Article 22(2) provides some 
limited exemptions to the prohibition. Explicit consent or automated decision-making 
necessary to facilitate the contractual performance between the data controller and data 
subject are two such examples. In such cases, Article 22(3) imposes obligations on data 
controllers to implement suitable measures which safeguard the rights of data subjects (i.e. 
privacy by design, principles of minimisation and proportionality and limited retention). 
Finally, article 22(4) stipulates that automated decision-making, including profiling 
involving sensitive categories of information such as those relating to aspects of an 
individual’s health, political, religious beliefs and race are prohibited unless explicit consent 
has been obtained or public interest warrants the adoption of the measure (Article 
9(2)(a)(g)), in addition to suitable safeguards protecting the legitimate interests and rights 
of the data subject being provided. Apart from the measures to safeguard data subjects 
indicated above, data controllers could, for example, satisfy this requirement by providing 
data subjects with a redress mechanism such as the opportunity to express their views to 
an authorised person. To ensure that data subjects are made aware of automated decision-
 making practices, data controllers must provide data subjects with meaningful information 
about the logic as well as any significant consequences resulting from the profiling and 
automated decision-making process (Article 13(2)(f)). 
 
Scrutiny of algorithms and their central role in data-driven operations will continue to gain 
increased attention from policy-makers. It seems bizarre that whereas democratic power 
structures in society, such as property, institutions and law, are not impervious to scrutiny 
and oversight, algorithms operating as technological rules of making up people from data 
seem to have been accorded the ‘immense privilege of invisibility’ (Ackerman 1980, 4). 
Algorithms have been problematised in terms of the ‘opacity’ of back-end processing 
activities (Burrell 2016), agents for automated veridiction (Fourcade and Healy 2016, 16), 
mathematical constructs of mirror worlds (O’Neill 2016) and personalisation agents 
(Turow, McGuigan, and Maris 2015). Article 22(1) can also be regarded as a regulatory 
intervention aimed at encouraging data controllers to introduce greater transparency by 
explaining the logic and consequences resulting from their data-driven operations (Article 
13(2)(f)). This is a significant regulatory innovation, which means that data controllers are 
potentially accountable for new knowledge about data subjects created by correlating 
computational and personal data (Hildebrandt 2008, 41). The discriminatory consequences 
resulting from the opacity of these forms of data-driven practices have been well-covered 
in the literature, with particular focus on advertising, marketing, health and civil liberty 
concerns (Hildebrandt 2015, 97–102 Schermer, Custers, and Van Der Hof 2014). The 
observations made by the Article 29 WP on the risks of marginalising the ‘human in the 
loop’ continue to be relevant and these can be summed up as follows: automated decision-
making and profiling create an imbalance in the relations between data controllers and data 
subjects; distortions, errors and bias can be amplified; surveillance trends remain unnoticed 
and compromises trust; and the scale and impact of harm to individuals difficult to quantify 
(2013). In limited instances, if it can be shown that contravention of data protection rules 
contributed to distress and anxiety, there is scope for relief ex post (Google v Gore-Vidal). 
How an algorithm ‘sees’ individuals is important from a data protection perspective for 
two reasons. First, since corporate actors and health organisations now have at their 
disposal software tools which autonomously seek to gain insights into individuals’ 
behaviour, preferences and values, there is no established standard of review to minimise 
or eradicate predictive harms to individuals (Tufecki 2015, 207). Second, merely focusing 
on the content of the communications or interactions in these communication spaces is 
 problematic since platform logics create material conditions that create a ‘two-way mirror’ 
with little or no regulatory oversight of the processes for constructing the algorithmic 
model of decision-making (Balkin 2012, 95). Some of the problems with the predecessor 
to Article 22 which are present have been extensively covered elsewhere (Savirimuthu 
2016). At present, data subjects have arguably no locus standi with regard to predictive 
harms that may result from algorithmic profiling ex ante. Some clarification is needed as to 
how much information or level of detail data controllers now need to make available to 
data subjects – assuming that contra ‘Cookie’ law – the volume of linked data is likely to be 
enormous or may involve disclosing commercial secrets. However, explaining to the 
individual the ‘logic’ may not be a real problem, if automated decision-making is of an 
administrative nature, or involves purchasing or news recommendations based on the 
individual’s profile. Algorithms already assist us on a wide range of matters – manage our 
health and fitness, choice of holiday destinations, restaurants, books and purchases. 
Human decision making is not always rational and technologies may have a particular role 
in society (Nagel, et al, 2016). In this respect, algorithms raise a broader issue – can or 
should individuals’ exercise of agency now be subjected to paternalistic interventions? This 
is not a question that can be readily answered. Any policy response must however consider 
three interrelated ideas which inform Article 22. First, new forms of sociality are being 
constructed by greater interconnectivity and sensor capabilities of devices and 
technological infrastructures and consequently, safeguards need to be implemented by data 
controllers. Second, transparency and awareness are regarded as necessary to raise data 
subjects’ awareness of how personal data and digital footprints create feedback loops for 
algorithms. Third, policy recognition that the knowledge generating and predictive 
capabilities of algorithms should be made meaningful to data subjects, particularly in 
respect of actual and possible outcomes (Article 29 WP Opinion 8/2014 p. 8, Barocas and 
Selbt, 2016). Platform infrastructures are repositories for petabytes of data, with machine 
learning algorithms emerging as the digital equivalent to actuarial science, creating 
calculated publics using nothing more than code to identify, select and classify. As artificial 
intelligence and automated decision making become interlinked with health and fitness 
activities of individuals, these “thinking machines” now create echo chambers and filter 
bubbles with the consequence that digital persona end up being ‘endowed with a life of 
their own’ (Fourcade and Healy, 2016 p.11). Rouvroy, building on Foucault’s vision of 
governmentality and Althusser’s ideology of technology, spells out the way technological 
infrastructures pose challenges for individuals’ agency, dignity and privacy. 
 Notwithstanding the considerable opportunities provided by the advent of new 
technologies, Rouvroy regards the threats posed by computer processes as linked to the 
focal point of these algorithms, not the embodied individual, [but] which “has as sole 
‘subject’, a ‘statistical body’, that is, a constantly evolving ‘data-body’ or network of 
localizations in actuarial tables” (2012, 11). These are not mere philosophical musings. It 
will be recalled that the Facebook emotional contagion study and disquiet engendered by 
‘Fake News’, suggest that curated information can be processed by algorithms to structure 
news feeds and influence individual’s agency and autonomy (Kramer et al, 2014, Tufecki, 
2015). The policy challenge is whether data protection law’s transparency rules extend to 
what Parisi describes as, adaptive algorithmic processes which exclude certain 
opportunities and choices from consumers (2013, 13). 
 
E. Of Semantic Discontinuity and the End(s) of Law. 
The European Data Protection Supervisor’s recent observations regarding the 
opportunities and challenges posed by new technologies and big data has called for a public 
debate about the role of ethics in data mining practices and expressed concerns about false 
trade-offs (EDPS Opinion 4/2015, 9). In two recent interventions, Cohen and 
Hildebrandt have lent their voices to this debate by introducing narrative frames to pierce 
the veil of the seeming inscrutability of technological infrastructures and called for the 
mirror worlds of digital identities to be subjected to due process and the rule of law. 
Hildebrandt’s account of the transition from print to digital, engages with a theme pursued 
in this article, which is that as sociotechnical technologies render invisible patterns visible 
only to data controllers, their goals and priorities may not be easily reconciled with human 
rights norms such as respect for human dignity and agency (2016, 217). Cohen’s concept 
of semantic discontinuity, by contrast, is not framed through the lens of a 
phenomenological account of technology (2012, 234). Semantic discontinuity, Cohen 
suggests, is an ‘interstitial flexibility within the system of legal rights, institutional 
arrangements, and associated technical controls’ (2012, 234). While we may encounter gaps 
and inconsistencies in technological, institutional and social structures, Cohen deploys the 
semantic discontinuity concept to illustrate the way algorithmic proxies dispatch frictions 
defining much of the practice of everyday life with its technical infrastructures now 
erecting rules of veridiction, whose legitimacy is teleological (Cohen 2017). Both 
contributions emphasise the challenge facing data protection law by highlighting threats to 
its doctrinal armory from personal data-dependent business models. This article provides 
 another way through which we can approach such debates. 
 
In summary, some reasons can be offered to explain why data protection rules will 
continue to struggle with the pressures imposed by data-driven business models in the 
plat- form economy for data subjects’ information rights. Most of these have been 
highlighted above: the misalignment of incentives, the interaction between the right to self-
determination and autonomy, and problems in identifying and articulating future harms 
which are ‘significant’. With the emergence of the Internet of Things, the innovations 
introduced by the GDPR in the form of privacy by design requirements, penalties for non-
compliance with data processing obligations and greater emphasis placed on transparency, 
portability, access and objection remedies are important policy interventions. Auditing 
algorithms may provide some respite should software codes anticipate what John likes to 
listen to when running, assist Colin in his rehabilitation or define Aisha’s new lifestyle 
expectations and values (Mittelstadt 2016). Whether this will serve any practical use or 
resonate with their needs or concerns when data controllers’ interests prevail is an 
important policy issue. The lexicon of standardisation, classification and reification casts 
doubts on whether data protection law can effectively mediate the space of information 
flows which bring into motion two different logics – the space of places where individuals 
assert their autonomy and information rights in an environment embedded with sensor 
technologies and the space of flows which continue to be tilted in favour of economic and 
political arrangements. The absence of boundaries between personal and non-personal 
data, and strains placed on free and informed consent in negotiating algorithmic decision-
making may continue to defy the ability of policy-makers to enforce these soft norms into 
the networked environment of information flows (Elmer 2004). The alignment between 
the ideal of autonomy, rights of self-determination and data protection continues to be a 
problematic one as: 
consent is a liberty-based construct, but effective data protection is first and  
foremost a matter of design. (Cohen 2017, 17) 
IV. Conclusion: Interregnum. 
The analysis undertaken in this article points to an alternative approach to framing 
understandings of health platforms and wearables, and situates our understanding of the 
GDPR within the communication spaces mediated by context-aware sensors and 
automated decision-making processes. The implications of the interplay between platform 
 logic and its algorithmic processes for flows of information seem to follow a type of 
Newtonian law of information flows, where institutional, regulatory arrangements and 
social practices combine to create a market-oriented technology of justice with corporate 
actors as its primary beneficiaries (cf. Ackerman 1980, 235). Platform logic and algorithms 
now present policy-makers with a social imaginary where both humans and affordances 
are co-evolving in ways that blur the boundaries, on the one hand, between personal and 
non-personal data and human and algorithmic cognition and decision-making, on the 
other (Parisi 2009). If data protection discourse is to be better calibrated with algorithmic 
divination and platform logics, how the GDPR renders justiciable, claims for regulatory 
rather than individual intervention when boundaries between an individual’s information 
rights, autonomy and algorithmic predictive capabilities eventually disappear, will be one 
of the defining moments in data protection jurisprudence. Data protection rules at its best 
can maximise the opportunities algorithms and the platform economy make possible in 
transforming health care and well-being of individuals in society. We may, however, need 
to temper our optimism. If the health and fitness space can be likened to a new chapter 
being inscribed into the algorithmic Book of Revelations, the worry is whether as each 
page is turned ‘we shall ever tell two identical stories of two different instances of making 
up people’ (Hacking 1986, 236). 
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